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 A review of David Newheiser, Hope in a Secular Age: 
Deconstruction, Negative Theology and the Future of 
Faith 
       Review by Amy Hickman  
David Newheiser’s Hope in a Secular Age makes the case for an ethical 
discipline characterised by self-critical hope as a source for unpredictable 
transformation in secular politics. Against the view that hope, and especially 
religious hope, is illusory and unsustainable, Newheiser argues that a hope that 
acknowledges its uncertainty bears within it a promise for future transformation 
and sustains the urgent work of addressing present political injustices. Newheiser’s 
account of hope is developed on the basis of his reading of two thinkers, neither of 
whom are consistently read in a particularly hopeful register: Dionysius the 
Areopagite and Jacques Derrida. Thus, Newheiser also develops the argument for 
approaching both Dionysius and Derrida, first of all, in conversation with one 
another, and secondly, with an ear attuned to hopeful affirmation. In claiming that 
the two authors “clarify the character of hope,”1 the implicit claim is that hope itself 
is in need of revising – or deconstructing – if it is to bear any promise for ethics, 
secular politics, and the future of faith.  
 The first half of the book is dedicated to pursuing ethical readings of Derrida 
and Dionysius and elaborating the character of the hope found there. Newheiser 
first approaches Derrida, arguing that deconstruction can be understood as a 
response to an ethical problem: that the security asserted by the metaphysics of 
presence provides a reassuring certitude that is ultimately illusory.2 Against the 
view that what Derrida affirms is only a kind of “total play” that would preclude the 
possibility of responsible political reflection altogether, Newheiser shows that, for 
Derrida, deliberation on particular ethical and political decisions is indispensable 
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precisely because of the undecidability that inhabits any such decision. The 
apparent negativity of deconstruction, particularly as it regards concepts such as 
justice and democracy, rather than a paranoid practice of mere exposure – that 
justice always exceeds the law and so cannot be attained, that all democracies 
must contain elements of the undemocratic to keep such “democracy” safe, and so 
on – is shown to bear a hopeful, indeed affirmative, comportment that keeps such 
concepts open to a future that remains to come. Precisely because our decisions 
provide no guarantees of justice or responsibility, Newheiser argues that Derrida’s 
insistence on critique “functions as an ethical practice of openness to the 
unexpected.”3 That Derrida calls justice and democracy impossible is a stumbling 
block for many readers here, and one that has led many to charge deconstruction 
with accusations of political nihilism. What Newheiser begins to elaborate in the 
early chapters, and returns to most forcefully in the second half of the book, is the 
precise character of the “impossible” in Derrida’s work; what is impossible is not 
what cannot happen, but what remains beyond the horizon of the possible as it is 
circumscribed in and by the present. Thus holding out hope for the impossible 
means nurturing the possibility of radical transformation; for Newheiser, then, 
Derrida’s insistence on critique can be said to constitute an ethical discipline 
insofar as it looks to preserve the (im)possibility of an incalculable justice that 
always remains to come.4 Nurturing this hope, then, also sustains urgent work on 
the present – driving engagement with and rectification of specific injustices as 
“justly as possible,” while at the same time remaining “open to revising one’s 
decision,” since “one can never be sure that one has decided well.”5 
 Newheiser then establishes his reading of the Dionysian corpus, focusing on 
the seemingly intractable contradictions found therein; that Dionysian negative 
theology is “resolutely affirmative” in that Dionysius “proliferates positive claims 
about God” even while concluding that “every name for God must be negated”;6 and 
that while he claims that God remains inaccessible to everyone, he also affirms a 
stratified hierarchy that ostensibly mediates access to God.7 Rather than looking to 
resolve these contradictions in favour of one side over the other, Newheiser argues 
that Dionysian apophasis is the practice of holding affirmation and negation in 
tension, by which every name for and claim made of God is both affirmed and 
negated. Dionysian apophasis, therefore, underscores the uncertainty of any 
affirmation, and its effect is the dispossession of the self in “abandon[ing] 
everything familiar in order to open oneself to unforeseeable development.”8 This 
helps explain the second contradiction, that between the ineffability of God and the 
ecclesial hierarchy that Dionysius affirms. Against the view that these should be 
treated in isolation, as separate parts of the Dionysian corpus, or the alternate 
view, that Dionysius sees the church as the source of sure salvation regardless of 
the inaccessibility of God in the present, Newheiser argues that the depth of 
Dionysian unknowing renders the ecclesial hierarchy itself fundamentally 
uncertain, calling “into question every claim to grasp the divine.”9 Ultimately, 
Newheiser argues, for Dionysius, Christian commitment consists in uncertain, 
fragile affirmations, and being raised up toward the divine is no certain path, but 
rather a struggle in which we always fall immeasurably short. Dionysius’s own 
attempts to speak of God, both affirmatively and negatively, thus always “remain 
provisional and subject to revision.”10 
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 Given that both authors, in Newheiser’s reading, develop a form of critique 
that both affirms and negates its object, Newheiser draws them together to 
produce an ethical account of hope that he sees as structurally consistent, though 
different in its object, across the work of both. While neither hold the same hopes, 
he argues that both hold onto their commitments in the same way – which is to say, 
a little loosely. That is, both, in his view, affirm particular hopes; neither see hope as 
constrained by what is possible in the present; and, for that reason, both see the 
object of hope as necessarily uncertain. Hopes are uncertain in more ways than 
one; they are liable to be disappointed, and should also be held open to revision. 
There is something implicitly radical about this account of hope, in that while we 
might normally assume – and several authors that Newheiser takes on argue – that 
hope implies, at least in some sense, that we think its object is attainable, the hope 
that Newheiser draws out from Derrida and Dionysius holds out for the impossible.  
As he rightly points out, hope (and, we might add, the hoper) is most in 
danger when its object is out of reach.11 The hope advocated here might accordingly 
seem the most dangerous kind, that is, a kind of cruel optimism, rising up when that 
which ignites hope “actually makes it impossible to attain the expansive 
transformation for which a person or a people risks striving,” or doubly cruel 
insofar as inhabiting such an impossible hope itself becomes perversely sustaining 
even while it does us harm.12 Newheiser acknowledges the dangers of such desires, 
but is careful to clarify the sense in which both authors hope for the impossible, in 
noting that “although Dionysius and Derrida describe a hope that incorporates a 
sort of indeterminacy, they do not claim that the object of their hope can never 
arrive.”13 Rather, both hope for something that exceeds the horizon of expectation in 
the present, as well as, potentially, our ability to identify it as such, should it arrive 
– the experience of the divine for Dionysius, and what we might call the à-venir or 
the future-to-come in Derrida. The significance of this is not merely to attest that 
hope does not require its object to be possible. The unspoken consequence, insofar 
as Newheiser claims that Derrida and Dionysius “clarify the character of hope,”14 is 
that hope that holds out for the impossible is the only possible hope. This isn’t to 
say that one can only hope for things that can never come to fruition, but rather that 
the act of hoping requires a certain unknowing; hope is always, in some sense, 
hope for the unexpected or the unforeseeable.  
The determination of hope, however, is accorded a special significance here. 
In Newheiser’s engagement with Derrida in particular, the concrete names that 
Derrida affirms serve as the locus of contestation with other commentators on 
Derrida, particularly John D. Caputo. In developing his account of hope in relation to 
secularisation, Newheiser revisits the contested relationship between Derrida and 
negative theology, taking on the opposing claims made in the influential accounts of 
Caputo and Jean-Luc Marion. The two authors serve an additional role here, beyond 
staking out the argument over Derrida’s (ir)religiosity: for Newheiser, they also 
exemplify what appear to be the available possibilities for faith in secular 
modernity: either a loose kind of spiritual indeterminacy (Caputo), or 
overconfidence in the security offered by worship (Marion). Here, Caputo’s “religion 
without religion” is characterised as – possibly reduced to – a purely 
indeterminable faith in which hope has no object.15 Newheiser provides an 
important corrective to many readers of (Caputo’s) Derrida in arguing that Derrida 
affirms determinate traditions and determinate names for what is hoped for; 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
 Book Review- Amy Hickman 
 235 
democracy and justice, most obviously, but even – in what may appear as a garden-
variety liberal attachment preventing any kind of true radicalism on Derrida’s part – 
Europe.16 Newheiser is also right to point out the “widespread elision between 
Caputo and Derrida” in this regard, that is, that many commentators “treat Caputo’s 
comments as if he spoke for Derrida.”17  
Against the indeterminate messianism that he sees advocated in Caputo’s 
reading, Newheiser argues that Derrida affirms concrete hopes, even those that are 
impossible or that always remain to come. But the hopes that Derrida affirms are 
those that are constitutively to come, such as democracy, of which Newheiser 
writes:  
This entails that it [democracy-to-come] cannot be identified, but that 
does not mean we must cease to speak of it. On the contrary, Derrida 
holds the indeterminate futurity of democracy to come in tension with 
determinate attempts to promote democracy in particular contexts… In 
his view, particular attempts to pursue democracy carry within them a 
hope for democracy that is undetermined. Rather than opposing 
indeterminate openness and determinate commitments, as Caputo 
claims, Derrida suggests that they are inseparable.18 
Putting aside whether this apparent opposition is substantiated in Caputo’s 
work, Newheiser gets right to the heart of Derrida’s hope. That is, what is nurtured 
as a promise under the determined name of democracy is not “more democracy” in 
the sense that most liberal democracies might themselves imagine – which is to 
say, tweaks to the system –but the “absolutely undetermined messianic promise” 
that democracy names.19 Affirming the inherited name of democracy at once affirms 
a certain determination of the concept – what is affirmed in democracy is not, for 
example, the authoritarianism that can arise from it – and at the same time the 
promise of the messianic, that is, of resolute openness to what is to come, of “an 
alterity that cannot be anticipated.”20  
This affirmation of what is to come, despite the depths of our unknowing 
regarding what may arrive, is for Newheiser not only – as it is most obviously in 
Derrida – what makes ethical responsibility both possible and urgent, but is also 
the mark of an ethics that he identifies in Derrida’s work (as well as Dionysius’s). 
For Newheiser, Derrida’s works well before the ostensible “ethical” or “political” 
turn demonstrate that deconstruction is an ethical practice insofar as it sustains 
hope for transformation; Derrida’s “discursive negativity” functions as “an ethical 
practice of openness to the unexpected.”21 Hospitality serves as an example of this 
ethics at work; or, more accurately, this ethics works in and through hospitality. 
That we desire hospitality despite its lack of assurance or even possibility, for 
Newheiser, elaborates the ethical posture of deconstruction in contrast to the 
ostensibly unethical alternatives; closure, complacency, and despair.22 In making 
this argument, Newheiser provides an important corrective to Martin Hägglund 
who, it should be noted, could be seen as the real antagonist of the book’s entire 
argument – who claims that “the command to ‘respect’ the alterity of the other does 
not make any sense if the other wants to destroy me.”23 According to Hägglund, 
unlike many influential interpreters of Derrida’s “ethics” such as Drucilla Cornell or 
Simon Critchley,24 Derrida has no particular respect for the other, and no particular 
desire to “say yes” to who or what comes. Instead, for Hägglund, the affirmation of 
alterity in Derrida’s work is not normative but inherent; everything and every 
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system is open to what is other to it.25 From Hägglund’s standpoint, because 
unconditional hospitality is both impossible and dangerous, Derrida does not desire 
unconditional hospitality, and nor does – or even can – anyone else. Newheiser 
responds that for Derrida, despite such dangers, “hospitality may nevertheless be 
pursued, for desire is not restricted to that which is safe.”26 Indeed, Derrida 
explicitly aligns desire with the impossible, situating the impossible as “the 
condition of desire.”27 As Newheiser puts it, “pure hospitality cannot be instantiated, 
and for this reason it is impossible. However… impossibility functions not to exclude 
desire, as Hägglund would have it, but to inflame passion all the more.”28 The fact, 
then, that we desire to welcome the other even while the other might do us harm, 
and even while we cannot know the stakes in advance, evinces for Newheiser a 
discipline of hope that allows us not only to affirm the other before all recognition 
or decidability, but also to reaffirm our decision – or critique it, which might mean 
deciding that our decision was, in retrospect, unjust. The impossible, for Newheiser, 
can be desired and pursued, but not with any assurances or certainty in doing so; 
the double movement of the affirmation of an impossible hospitality or a justice that 
remains to come, along with the reaffirmation in the present of our uncertain 
decisions – even while we may betray or be betrayed by such affirmations—
constitutes the ethicality of being open to the other. In placing hospitality at the 
centre of ethics, as “essential to ethical relation,”29 Newheiser makes the desire for 
the impossible not only exemplary of but necessary to this “ethics of uncertainty.”   
This reading is consistent with Derrida’s remarks on ethical and political 
decision in relation to a justice that remains to come. This “hopeful” political 
interpretation is perhaps most evident in Specters of Marx, in which Derrida argues 
that insofar as there is a promise of political justice (“a democratic promise” or a 
“communist promise”) it must “always keep within it… this absolutely undetermined 
messianic hope at its heart.”30 Without hospitality as the experience of the 
impossible, he argues, “one might as well give up on both justice and the event… 
One might as well give up also on whatever good conscience one still claims to 
preserve.”31 Indeed for Derrida it is the experience of the impossible, and the very 
lack of decidability, that opens the space of ethics and politics: 
Ethics, politics, and responsibility, if there are any, will only ever have 
begun with the experience and experiment of the aporia. When the 
path is clear and given, when a certain knowledge opens up the way in 
advance, the decision is already made, it might as well be said that 
there is none to make: irresponsibly, and in good conscience, one 
simply applies or implements a program.32  
Of course, this does not leave us with a straightforward ethico-political 
orientation. Newheiser’s “ethics of uncertainty” certainly avoids the risks of a 
“deconstructive ethics” that Derrida warns against:  
A consensual euphoria or, worse, a community of complacent 
deconstructionists, reassured and reconciled with the world in ethical 
certainty, good conscience, satisfaction of service rendered, and the 
consciousness of duty accomplished (or, more heroically still, yet to 
be accomplished).33  
By the same token, we might question whether or not we would want to 
describe such an uncertain affirmation as “an ethics,” or as evidence of an ethics. 
That is, should ethics be understood in terms of normative principles that allow 
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decisions to be made, with if not full ethical certainty, then at least “good 
conscience,” affirming the uncertainty of any decision and nurturing an 
“undetermined messianic promise” – even if it is affirmed under the determined 
names of democracy, responsibility, or even Europe – cannot hope to meet this 
standard. It is for this reason that Geoffrey Bennington has argued that “ethics is 
metaphysical through and through and can therefore never simply be assumed or 
affirmed in deconstruction. The demand or desire for a ‘deconstructive ethics’ is in 
this sense doomed to be disappointed.”34 To act on the basis, then, of preserving and 
affirming uncertainty, insisting on “never [being] sure that one has decided well,”35 
would perhaps, then, mean putting aside if not ethics “itself” then at least a certain 
view of ethics as a program for responsible action. 
  How small and uncertain, then, can ethics be? Newheiser acknowledges that 
without content, hope, no matter how disciplined, cannot be advocated as a virtue, 
noting in a parenthesis:  
Because I believe rationality is extrinsic to hope, I am reluctant to call 
hope a virtue: whether hope is good or bad depends upon its content, 
but hope itself lacks the criteria to adjudicate such questions.36 
Even the content of hope, too, must remain uncertain, subject to a “self-
critical vigilance” that provides no guarantees regarding justice. By this standard, 
we could suggest – perhaps unfairly – that Newheiser’s redeployment of the name 
of ethics for something far less certain (and less metaphysical) than ethics properly 
speaking might be an attempt to salvage some assurance, if not of “the 
consciousness of duty accomplished,” then perhaps that of a duty or justice “yet to 
be accomplished.”37 On the other hand, however, we might suggest that the attempt 
to keep the name of ethics serves to keep ethics open to whatever might exceed 
this metaphysical determination. That is, even while the term “ethics” escapes 
unscathed in Newheiser’s account, perhaps his insistence throughout on “holding 
affirmation and negation in tension in order to resist the danger of complacency 
and despair”38 – as an ethical practice – can also be turned on ethics “itself.” 
Notwithstanding his appeals to its “good name,” that is, the manner in which 
Newheiser articulates this ethics throughout underscores its attendant risks of 
pervertibility and self-negation. We might suggest, then, that the ethics of Hope in a 
Secular Age (and hope in a secular age) could signal the possibility of an ethics 
sous rature: one that is negated insofar as an ethics of hope refuses to settle into 
an ethics proper as a self-assured program for just action, but affirmed insofar as 
the name might nurture a promise for something other than, or more ethical than 
ethics, something that remains to come.  
 Hope in a Secular Age provides a thorough exposition of Derrida’s 
engagements with negative theology, supplemented with unpublished archival 
material that will be of interest to those well-versed in the debates on the subject 
within the secondary literature. The manner in which Newheiser draws together 
Derrida and Dionysius as sharing a hope identical in kind, but not in content, 
provides a compelling claim to consider Derrida’s engagements with Dionysius 
beyond the ground staked out by previous commentators, particularly in the terms 
of Newheiser’s claim that the point of contact between the two hinges on ethics 
rather than epistemology. But Newheiser’s treatment of Derrida in terms of an 
ethics of hope might be the most significant contribution (as well as the most easily 
overlooked). In identifying an ethical comportment in the practice of deconstruction 
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and in Derrida’s interest in negative theology that goes beyond a normative ethics 
of respect for the other as the stranger, Newheiser signals that there is more to be 
done with hope – not as a principle to guide responsible action, but (“merely”) as a 
disposition. There are questions that remain to be addressed, the most urgent of 
which might be whether such emphasis on hope as a source for political 
transformation might risk appropriation into a neoliberal political order that would 
advocate for hope in lieu of material change. It is for this reason, then, that such 
“self-critical vigilance” as Newheiser puts forward is absolutely necessary. Far 
from immunising against such risks, the (deconstructive and apophatic) hope that 
Newheiser identifies in Derrida and Dionysius must be taken up, responded to, 
acted upon, and yes, critiqued – which is to say, affirmed as a promise of what 
remains to come.  
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